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Internet Casinos: A Sure Bet for Money
Laundering
Jon Mills*
Since the end of World War II, American society has seen the
emergence of technology promising to make life easier, better and
longer lasting. The more recent explosion of the Internet is
fulfilling the dreams of the high-tech pundits as it provides global
real-time communication links and makes the world's knowledge
universally available. Privacy concerns surrounding the develop-
ment of the Internet have mounted, and in response, service
providers and web site operators have enabled web users to
conduct transactions in nearly complete anonymity. While
anonymity respects individual privacy, anonymity also facilitates
criminal activities needing secrecy. One such activity is money
laundering, which is now being facilitated by the emerging Internet
casinos industry. These casinos can be physically located anywhere
with web sites available worldwide. Internet casinos were a target
of legislation by the United States Congress, but the legislation, the
Internet Gambling Prohibition Act, failed to pass. So, at the
moment, Internet casinos are a virtually unregulated mechanism for
laundering illegal funds.
This problem crosses national boundaries. Consequently, the
nations concerned with preventing money laundering must
cooperate. The United States has enacted a host of laws that
enable the government to prosecute both the root crime of money
laundering, as well as the means, on-line gambling. But, effective
eradication of this criminal enterprise will require international
cooperation.
* Interim Dean, Professor of Law & Director of Center for Governmental
Responsibility, University of Florida, Levin College of Law.
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A. Money Laundering and Internet Casino Industry
The greatest criminal threat posed by the blossoming virtual
gaming industry is the unprecedented potential it presents for
criminal elements seeking to launder their ill-gotten gains.' Current
estimates suggest that between $300 and 500 billion dollars are
laundered each year,2 and many prosecutors agree that it is easy
and economical to launder criminal proceeds through offshore
casinos.3 For example, when Florida plays Florida State in football,
place a bet on each team. Regardless of the outcome, and provided
the gambler has properly structured the bets, the gambler will lose
the bet placed on the losing team, but the bet on the winning team
will be paid double; all the gambler has really lost is the "vigorish,"
the house or bookie's cut. In a similar fashion, offshore, and hence,
invisible, profits can be created, or visible, and hence, declarable
and deductible, losses can be generated. Dirty money has been
laundered.4
More broadly, money laundering is the process of "placing the
illegally-acquired money into the global financial system without
raising suspicion: depositing it into a bank, conducting a number of
transactions with the money to create a confusing or hidden audit
trail, and then withdrawing the funds."5 Following the passage of
the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986,6 criminal proceeds are
"perpetually illegal" and criminals must, therefore, launder their
illegal profits in order to facilitate their use.' If the funds from a
criminal enterprise are not laundered before they are spent, the
spender is more likely to face tax evasion charges, prosecution
1. See New Technologies Contain Potential for Massive Fraud, BANKING
POL'Y REP., Mar. 4-18, 1996, at 36 [hereinafter New Technologies].
2. See Lisa A. Barbot, Comment, Money Laundering: An International
Challenge, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161, 163 (1995); Scott Sultzer, Comment,
Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat It, 63
TENN. L. REV. 143, 146 (1995). See also Konstantin D. Magliveras, Defeating the
Money Launderer - The International and European Framework, 1992 J. Bus. L.
161 (1992).
3. See Steven Crist, All Bets are Off, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 26, 1998, at
90.
4. See John E. Hogan, Comment, World Wide Wager: The Feasibility of
Internet Gambling Regulation, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 815, 823 (Summer 1998).
5. Rajeev Saxena, Note and Comment, Cyberlaundering: The Next Step for
Money Launderers?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 685, 691 (1998).
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1994).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994); see also United States v. Jensen, 69 F.3d 906,
912 (8th Cir. 1995).
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relating to the original criminal activity and the loss of the funds
altogether.8
It is therefore important to realize that the laundering of
money does not make that money legal. Again, it remains
perpetually illegal. The effort to launder money is made to render
detection of the illegal activities, and their profits, difficult, if not
impossible.
Laundered criminal funds are both an end in themselves, as the
"reward" for criminal endeavors, and also a means of funding
further criminal acts, including, but certainly not limited to
"funding terrorism and organized crime, hiding taxable income, and
generally making a variety of crimes, which range from smuggling
to counterfeiting, appear to be legitimate enterprises which are
highly profitable." 9 However, in the past, laundering funds was
more difficult because of the built-in mechanisms and the necessity
of funneling the funds through traditional, and highly regulated,
financial institutions. Emerging technology, including the Inter-
net's cyber-banking industry, will "revolutionize" the money
laundering process and make it significantly easier for launders to
insert dirty money into the stream of international commerce, to
churn, or wash it, through legitimate businesses and hide its origin,
and then to withdraw the money, ready to be spent."0 The nature of
the Internet allows transactions to occur almost instantaneously and
with anonymity, thus allowing the criminal launderer to avoid
detection because there is no trail to follow, and, since no
traditional financial institutions have been involved, there are no
red flags alerting the law enforcement to the possibility of criminal
activity."
B. Money Laundering Is Illegal and Statutorily Prohibited
"The United States is certainly one of the leading money
laundering nations in the world,"12 and there are innumerable ways
money can be laundered. It can be smuggled out of the United
States, laundered in another country that has relaxed banking
& See Emily J. Lawrence, Note, Let the Seller Beware: Money Laundering,
Merchants and 18 U.S.C. 1956, 1957, 33 B.C. L. REv. 841,841 (1992).
9. Saxena, supra note 5, at 687.
10. See New Technologies, supra note 1, at 36.
11. See Bruce Zagaris & Scott B. MacDonald, Money Laundering, Financial
Fraud, and Technology: The Perils of an Instantaneous Economy, 26 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L & ECON. 61, 63 (1992).
12. Fletcher N. Baldwin, Money Laundering and Wire Transfers: When the
New Regulations Take Effect, Will they Help?, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 413, 415 (1996).
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regulations or strict secrecy laws, and then returned the States once
it has been adequately layered, or mixed, with legitimate funds. 3
Or, a money launderer can acquire a legitimate business, preferably
one with a large volume of cash transactions, and show the illegal
proceeds as profit generated by the presumptively legal, and
profitable, business.' Alternatively, a money launderer can deposit
the illegal funds in a bank, and by transferring sums less than
$10,000, create a "legitimate" history of the funds. However, due to
the reporting requirements, "structuring" is not practical for large-
scale money laundering operations."
Using one of the three primary wire systems, a money
launderer can, via instructions sent from one bank to another, have
funds transferred from one account to any other account(s). It is
easy to hide illegal funds among the millions of transfers affected by
these systems, which transferred $474 trillion among various banks
in 1995 alone.16 A money launderer could launder his illegal funds
by expatriating them, and then using them as collateral for a loan in
the foreign jurisdiction. He would now repatriate the loaned funds
as legally acquired. If the money launderer selected a foreign
nation with strict banking secrecy laws, any law enforcement
authority would be able to trace the loaned funds only as far back
as the originating bank, but not to the client who received the loan
from the bank.7 Foreign banks are also used for their "payable
through" accounts, which they maintain at banks in the United
States. The foreign bank will transfer all funds between it and the
13. See Sultzer, supra note 2, at150, 186-187 (The United States Postal Service
is often chosen for its reliability in removing and reintroducing illegal funds into
the United States economy). See also John J. Fialka, Drug Dealers Export Billions
of Dollars to Evade Laws on Currency Reporting, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1994, at A4.
14. See Sultzer, supra note 2, at 156 (Businesses suited to money laundering
activities include restaurants, bars, clubs, adult entertainment establishments, gas
stations, video rental stores and parking garages).
15. See id. at 152. See also Frank C. Razzano, American Money Laundering
Statutes: The Case for a Worldwide System of Banking Compliance Programs, 3 J.
INT'L L. & PRAC. 277, 280-281 (1994); Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money
Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of Structuring Transactions,
41 FLA. L. REV. 287, 288 (1989); Gerard Wyrsch, Comment, Treasury Regulation
of International Wire Transfer and Money Laundering: A case for a Permanent
Moratorium, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 515, 515 n.1 (1992).
16. See Wyrsch, supra note 15, at 515, 518-520 (The three primary wire systems
are the Federal Reserve Communications System (Fedwire), the Clearing House
Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), and the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunications S.C. (SWIFT)). See also Sarah J. Hughes, Policing
Money Laundering Through Fund Transfers: A Critique of Regulation Under the
Bank Secrecy Act, 67 IND. L. J. 283, 290-291.
17. See Saxena, supra note 5, at 695.
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U.S. bank through that account, and often give customers
permission to conduct their own banking business out of the same
account. These accounts are usually not as closely monitored
because the foreign bank is expected to transfer large amounts
through such an account."
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)19 was created in an
effort to coordinate and augment international anti-money
laundering efforts." This Task Force works with other international
organizations, including the International Criminal Police Organ-
ization (Interpol) and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of American States.'
In the United States, the parallel organization is the FinCEN, an
offshoot of the Treasury Department, that "evaluates money
laundering threats, supports law enforcement agencies and imple-
ments the Bank Secrecy Act., 22 It is designed to "serve as a central
source for financial analysis and intelligence retrieval to assist in
money laundering and other financial crimes investigations."23
Significantly, FinCEN collects data from the CTRs and SARs which
financial entities file.24
Beginning in the 1970s, Congress enacted several acts designed
to deter money laundering and tax evasion. The Bank Secrecy Act,
a part of the Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act, was
prompted by concerns that foreign banks were being used to
launder funds, a crime itself, as well as to evade applicable U.S.
taxes.25 The Bank Secrecy Act requires transactions over $10,000 to
18. See Money Laundering Trends, MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP., Feb. 1997,
1,7.
19. Created in 1989 at the G-7 Paris Summit. See Barbot, supra note 2, at 173.
20. See id. at 173.
21. See Barbot, supra note 2, at 175-177 (citing Bruce Zagaris & Shiela M.
Castilla, Construction of International Financial Enforcement Subregime: The
Implementation of Anti-Money Laundering Policy, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 871, 884
(1993)). See also Hans-Albrecht Schraepler, DIRECTORY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 158 (1996).
22. Efforts to Fight Financial Crimes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
General Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Banking and
Financial Serv., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus (Rep.,
Ala.)), available at 1997 WL 133277.
23. Efforts to Fight Financial Crimes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
General Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Banking and
Financial Serv., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Stanley Morris, Dir. FinCEN),
available at 1997 WL 133277.
24. See id. (The CTR is the Currency Transaction Report that must be filed
for every transaction in excess of $10,000).
25. See Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§1951-1959 (1994)). See also John K. Villa, A Critical View of Bank
Secrecy Act Enforcement and the Money Laundering Statutes, 37 CATH. U. L. REV.
2000]
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be reported, in order to alert the law enforcement authorities to
"suspicious" transactions that could be the initial step in the money
laundering process. While it encountered controversy," it has been
upheld and is still applicable to specified financial institutions, and
all individuals transporting in excess of $10,000 into or out of the
United States. 7 These requirements are now applicable to all non-
banking financial institutions.'
However, these regulations were inadequate to prevent money
laundering, and the Money Laundering Control Act was passed. It
"criminalized money laundering and structuring and provided for
both civil and criminal forfeitures of funds or property implicated in
the laundering.'29 The act of money laundering itself was now
illegal. The MLCA also criminalized structuring, the process of
breaking up large sums purposefully, so as to avoid the $10,000
threshold for required reporting? A part of the MLCA, the Right
to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, gives banks limited protection for
disclosing client information, in good faith, when there are signs of
money laundering." In 1988, Congress enacted the Money
Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act, which imposes liability
and penalties on professionals who assist money launderers,
including negligent bankers. This Act increased the cooperation
between such professionals and their financial institutions and
FinCEN.32 Finally, the Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994
was enacted to reconcile growing differences among the various
anti-money laundering statutes. It also streamlined the reporting
489, 491 (1988).
26. The Banking Secrecy Act was before the Supreme Court in California
Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435 (1976).
27. See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a), (b) (1994); see also 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1997).
28. See Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2243 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5330
(1994)); see also Barbot, supra note 2, at 186. The 1992 Annunzio-Wylie Anti-
Money Laundering Act and the 1994 Money Laundering Suppression Act
extended the reach of the Banking Secrecy Act, while guarding against undue
reporting burdens on the financial institutions. Id. These Acts closed a significant
loophole in the original Act, and brought all financial institutions under the same
regulations designed to deter financial crimes. Id.
29. Sultzer, supra note 2, at 158-159.
30. See id.
31. See Duncan E. Alford, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden on
Financial Institutions, 19 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 437, 459 (1994). (Without
such protection, the bank would be liable to an innocent client for having reported
them to government officials, and for having disclosed otherwise protected
information).
32. See id. See also Lara W. Short, et al., The Liability of Financial Institutions
for Money Laundering, 109 BANKING L.J. 46, 63-64 (1992).
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requirement, so that the government can receive the information it
needs to monitor financial crimes, but without subjecting the
financial institutions to expensive reporting procedures or
unreasonable liability.33
The Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), and its
enforcement mechanism, Regulation E, were passed as a first
attempt at regulating the transfer of funds through an electronic
medium.' This Act "establishes the basic rights, liabilities, and
responsibilities of consumers who use electronic money transfer
services, and of financial institutions that regulate these services.,
35
Regulation E protects individual consumers, at the expense of the
financial institutions. Currently, only Regulation E addresses
"cyber-banking. 36
II. Challenges to Preventing Money Laundering Using Internet
Casinos
The Internet provides individuals worldwide with the ability to
communicate and exchange information across national boundaries
and continents. The project to connect scientists and defense
agencies has united the globe with access to information, available
anywhere, at any time.37 While facilitating commerce and commun-
ication, the Internet also facilitates the ability of criminals to elude
the laws of any, and every, nation.38 This "ethereal" Internet allows
much cyber-crime, and with the advent of Internet gambling, the
Internet now offers a technique to launder funds with unprec-
edented speed, ease and anonymity across international
boundaries.39 The Internet gambling industry is not insignificant.
Revenues are projected at 25 billion dollars and are of concern to
tax collectors and law enforcement internationally.4° To succeed,
33. See Barbot, supra note 2, at 190-191, 218.
34. See Richard L. Field, 1996: Survey of the Year's Developments in Electronic
Cash Law and the Laws Affecting Electronic Banking in the United States, 46 AM.
U. L. REV. 967, 975 (1997).
35. 12 C.F.R. §205.1(b) (1997); see also John K. Halvey, The Virtual
Marketplace, 45 EMORY L. J. 959, 968 (1996).
36. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b).
37. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 621 U.S. 844
(1997).
38. See Hogan, supra note 4, at 818-819.
39. See Marc S. Friedman & Kristin Bissinger, Infojacking: Crimes on the
Information Superhighway, 9 NO. 5 J. PROPRIETARY RIGHTs 2, 2 (1997). See also
Lawrence, supra note 8, at 4.
40. See Internet Gambling Soon to Become a 25-billion-dollar Industry,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 1, 1997, available at 1997 WL 13405120.
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law enforcement needs cooperative efforts from the international
community.
A. Sovereignty and International Relations
While there are myriad reasons to cooperate, universal
international cooperation is an elusive goal. The Internet, because
of its very nature as a network-based technology, requires multi-
national oversight to provide effective enforcement. The Internet is
not aligned with geography, and users have access to sites and
information without regard for, or hindrance from, the territorial
origin of that data." Consequently, so long as some jurisdictions
are willing to allow Internet gambling sites, these virtual casinos are
not subject to effective regulation by any one nation, or even a
group of nations, because a site permitted in just one jurisdiction is
accessible from all others. Large-scale laundering of criminal
profits can only be prevented by broad jurisdictional cooperation.
A partial success is no success at all, for it matters not to a would-be
money launderer whether the site he relies on to launder his money
is based in Antigua, Grenada or Liechtenstein. 2 As long as there
are nations willing to be host to on-line casinos, law enforcement
officials worldwide will be fighting against stacked odds.
Effective prosecution of criminals requires international
cooperation. While it is relatively simple to obtain evidence that
on-line gambling has occurred, it is difficult to ascertain the size and
scope of that gambling operation, and whether money is being
laundered. Tracing a paper trail in an electronic environment
requires the cooperation of foreign governments and is made
increasingly difficult because of the complete anonymity of current
cyber-banking and the increasing use of encryption technology,
which obliterates the paper trail. 3 And, even when the evidence is
41. See Jonathan I. Edelstein, Note, Anonymity and International Law
Enforcement in Cyberspace, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 231,
237 (1996).
42. See Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 717 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1997) (discussing WagerNet's activities in Belize); Mark Fineman,
'Virtual Casinos' Cash in on Lax Rules in Antigua, LA TIMES, Sept. 21, 1997, at Al
(Antiguans are largely unaware of on-line gambling operations, even though they
generate millions per month for operators; operators required to pay large
licensing fees to government); Brett Pulley, On Antigua, It's Sun, Sand and 1-800
Betting, NY TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998 (Curacao hosts numerous bookie operations);
Benjamim Weiser, U.S. Charges 14 with On-line Sports Betting Operations, NY
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998 (Antigua, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic are home
to such operations); Betting Money on the Web, NY TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998.
43. See Aaron Craig, Gambling on the Internet, 1998 CoMP. L. REV. & TECH.
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available, the prosecuting nation must rely on the existence of
applicable extradition treaties or agreements, or extra-legal
attempts to bring suspects within the prosecuting country's
borders. 4 The notable lack of agreement further hinders crime-
fighting efforts.45 Finally, the legal costs of fighting venue/forum
non conveniens, jurisdiction and notice for every trial are a
significant deterrent to effective prosecution.46
International cooperation is also suggested by other policy
considerations. Individual nations also have an interest in
protecting their own citizens from fraudulent on-line activities.
International cooperation is necessary to develop secure connec-
tions for legitimate financial transactions. Without the ability to
detect and monitor on-line gambling, no nation is able to protect its
citizens from scam artists who have no intention of paying out
winnings; nor is it possible to provide them with effective relief.'
General international cooperation should generally benefit
Internet commerce, as opposed to being only a regulatory burden.
Professor Burk contends that "the prospect of states applying
haphazard and uncoordinated multi-jurisdictional regulation to the
Internet's seamless electronic web raises profound questions
regarding the continued growth and usefulness of this
medium...."' Fragmented regulation leaves as the only options
expensive or difficult compliance or shutting down. 9 The costs of
redundant and contradictory regulations can deter the growth and
expansion of commerce worldwide. Such fragmentation might
occur among the sovereign states within the United States.
Notably, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the Constitution's
Commerce Clause guards against such consequences by
discouraging "statutes that adversely affect interstate commerce by
subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations."'" Uniform regula-
J. 61, 95 (1998).
44. See id. at 96.
45. See Friedman & Bissinger, supra note 39, at 9 (many computer crimes are
not extraditable offenses).
46. See Craig, supra note 43, at 96.
47. See Hogan, supra note 4, at 856.
48. Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World without Borders, 1 VA. J. L. & TECH.
5 (1997).
49. See Hogan, supra note 4, at 844.
50. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.D.
Pa. 1997); John Gibeaut, Questions of Authority, 83 A.B.A.J. 42, 43 (1997)
(quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass.
1997)).
51. Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica, 830 F.2d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 1987).
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tion is logical and, within the United States, supportable through
Commerce Clause interpretations.
Currently, Internet casino operators are eschewing the United
States for less restrictive jurisdictions, including Antigua, Belize,
Costa Rica, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Grenada and
Liechtenstein. These countries are preferable for Internet casinos,
both because of their more favorable tax laws and their lack of
applicable extradition treaties with the United States.52 Some host
nations require the virtual casinos to pay a yearly licensing fee, or
require that web sites post a bond with the local gaming
commission to guarantee that winnings will be paid, or both.
However, the amount of winnings distributed exceeds the amount
of the bond within a few days of the casino's opening. 3 Some
nations have even created a free trade zone, in which the Internet
casinos can operate free from any corporate tax liability.
54
In the international arena, there are two additional "costs"
associated with regulating Internet gambling operations. First,
largely because of the implications of on-line casinos for funding
criminal endeavors, national and international bodies are imposing
on a traditionally local authority.5 Second, if the United States
wishes to enforce opposition to money laundering done through
Internet casinos in other jurisdictions, the United States must assess
the degree of cooperation from other jurisdictions and carefully
weigh the cost attached to extradition and prosecution for violation
of gambling laws. The doctrine of comity, which determines the
degree of "recognition which one nation allows within its territory
to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience," will
govern the expenditure of U.S. international political capital for
such endeavors against the need to aggressively prosecute other on-
line financial crimes56
In sum, international cooperation is a prerequisite to any
prevention of money laundering through Internet casinos. The
52. See Pulley, supra note 42 ("[o]f the approximately 60 offshore sports books
in operation throughout the Caribbean and Central America, 25 are based in
Antigua, according to local officials, who in 1994 created a free trade zone where
the bookies can operate without paying corporate taxes.").
53. See Crist, supra note 3, at 88 (within minutes, the value of wagers placed
exceed the bonds securing the winnings).
54. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
55. See Howard G. Zaharoff and Thomas W. Evans, Cyberspace and the
Internet. Law's Newest Frontier, 41 BOST. B. J. 14, 14 (1997).
56. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-164 (1895).
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technical complexities of the Internet make international
cooperation among jurisdictions the threshold issue.
B. Jurisdictional Concerns
To prosecute money laundering through Internet casinos, some
entity must have legal jurisdiction. Under the requirements put
forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,7 a court must find
that the on-line casino has had sufficient contacts with the state in
which the federal court is located so that bringing the on-line casino
into that court is fair. Since the Internet gambling operation might
not be considered to be physically present in the state, the court
must find that a two-part inquiry into minimum contacts and
fairness is satisfied,58 such that the casino would have had "fair
warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign."59 The minimum contacts prong
is satisfied if the casino has "purposefully directed" activities at the
forum state. 6° This contact cannot be merely passive, but must be
substantial enough61 to show that the casino has clearly enjoyed the
privilege of doing business in the forum state.62 The fairness prong
addresses whether it is reasonable to subject the casino to the
jurisdiction of the court in the forum state.63 The court must find
either that it would be unfair to allow the casino to escape being
brought before it, or that it was foreseeable that the casino would,
at some point, be brought into that forum's court.' Consequently, a
reasonable definition of contact could provide jurisdiction.
In re DES Cases5 present an alternative means of gaining
jurisdiction over Internet casinos. There the court held that it had
jurisdiction over all of the hormone manufacturers, irrespective of
any individual manufacturer's actual and specific connections with
any particular state, because they had all introduced their products
into the "national economic pond."66 Under this ruling, personal
57. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
58. See Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990); Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
59. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
60. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472.
61. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
62. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
63. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
64. See World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474.
65. In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
66. Id. at 589.
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jurisdiction exists upon a showing of an "appreciable state
interest."" It can be argued that the Internet is an economic pond,
albeit a global one, because the individual web sites can be accessed
from any other point around the world, and thus jurisdiction over
Internet gambling sites is proper, provided that the forum state has
an "appreciable interest" in the suit and that it is not unreasonable
for the casino operators to defend the suit in that forum.6,
The application of this theory to the Internet was borne out in
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,69 where the court held that the
defendant's placement of goods into the stream of commerce (he
sold goods via the Internet to Ohio residents) justified the Ohio
court's jurisdiction over him. It appears obvious that an on-line
casino is placing a product, the opportunity to gamble, into the
stream of commerce. If the virtual casino allows the user to place a
bet, then the forum state in which the user is located should be able
to exercise jurisdiction over the Internet gambling operator. 70 A
second Internet case, Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.,7t
established that the creation of a web site in one state was the
equivalent of constantly broadcasting an advertisement with the
same content at the residents of another state. This conclusion,
plus evidence that residents in the recipient state called the toll free
number provided, was adequate for the recipient state to have
jurisdiction.7 ' There is, thus, precedent for not treating the Internet
as sui generis. Rather, the Internet may be more akin to an
electronic billboard, and therefore could be bound by all applicable
media-neutral laws. The reasoning in this case would also support
jurisdiction over an Internet casino once bets had been placed in a
given jurisdiction.
However, the Internet gambling operators themselves may,
through their own actions, provide the basis for jurisdiction. Before
the on-line casino allows the individual gambler to place a bet, it
will have taken many purposeful steps to ensure that, in the event
the gambler loses, the casino gets its money." While advertising
67. Id. at 587.
6& See Seth Gorman and Antony Loo, Blackjack or Bust: Can U.S. Law Stop
Internet Gambling?, 16 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 667, 684-685 (1996).
69. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
70. See id; Burger King, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
71. No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431 (D. Minn. Dec. 11, 1996), affd 568
N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
72 See Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn.
1996).
73. See Bruce P. Keller, The Game's the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace
Violates Federal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1599 (May 1999).
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and the mere "placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum State,"74 once the gambler has released his credit
card information to the on-line casino, and the casino has
responded by sending over the Internet the multitude of images
that constitutes the game being played, it is clear that there has
been a purposeful directing of communication toward the forum
state based on the responses of the Internet gambler. 5 The casino
can argue that an individual gambler is not necessarily identifiable
by geographic location.
United States case law, by analogy, supports a finding of
jurisdiction over foreign subjects located in gambling-legal
jurisdictions. As early as 1818, the courts had the authority to
punish acts of piracy, even when the offending party was a
foreigner." More recently, the court supported the use of 18 U.S.C.
1084 as a means of prosecuting communications between the
United States and offshore, gambling-legal jurisdictions to obtain
jurisdiction over a party geographically located outside the United
States.77 The Supreme Court reiterated this message in U.S. v.
Fabrizio,18 when it held that when Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. 1084,
it was aware of other nations' legal lotteries and did not include
exceptions or exemptions. Therefore "even lawful state or foreign-
based gambling operations properly were included within the scope
of federal prohibitions."
In Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn,79 the court held that
the defendant's conduct was sufficient to subject him to personal
jurisdiction in the United States when he participated in an auction
via telephone. This type of electronic transaction could be
rationally analogized to an Internet communication. Other tele-
phone cases have established that jurisdiction in the forum state
cannot be evaded by conducting an illegal activity over the
telephone in a jurisdiction where the activity is legal-the courts
usually find that the foreign participation is virtually present in the
forum state.' And, the Internet casinos' contacts with the United
74. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
75. See State v. Rossbach, 288 N.W. 2d 714 (Minn. 1980); Gorman & Loo,
supra note 68, at 681-682.
76. See U.S. v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610 (1818).
77. See U.S. v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639 (10th Cir. 1995).
78. See 385 U.S. 263 (1966).
79. 256 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
80. See PaineWebber Inc. v. Westgate Grp., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 115, 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Otterbourg, Steindler, Houston & Rosen P.C. v. Shreve City
Apartments Ltd., 543 N.Y.S.2d 978 (App. Div. 1989); China Union Lines v.
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States are usually not restricted to cyberspace alone; the virtual
casinos' non-cyber contacts with U.S. citizens involve various other
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and thus the on-line
casino operators have violated federal laws.81
The groundwork for the conclusion that 18 U.S.C. 1084 is
lawfully applicable to Internet gambling prosecutions was laid in
U.S. v. Edge Broadcasting.' The Court acknowledged that
Congress has broad powers under the Commerce Clause by
upholding Champion v. Ames, and it upheld the validity of a federal
gambling prosecution based, at least in part, on the prosecution of a
gambling operation outside the United States in a jurisdiction that
had legalized gambling. By harkening back to Pensacola Telegraph
v. Western Union Telegraph,3 the Court reiterated that Congress'
Commerce Clause powers "are not confined to the instrument-
alities of commerce... known or in use when the Constitution was
adopted, but.., keep pace with the progress of the country, and
adapt themselves to the new developments of time and
circumstance."'  Certainly, the conclusion that the Internet is an
instrumentality of interstate commerce is logical.
This series of cases would indicate that reasonably crafted
federal regulation could obtain jurisdiction over Internet gambling
activities that involve participants in, or are targeted at, the United
States. Yet, such jurisdiction does not provide a complete solution.
Once jurisdiction is established, actually securing the necessary
information becomes the next significant hurdle to clear; a lack of
international cooperation and technological barriers still hinder
effective enforcement of existing laws. Also, restrictions on
Internet activities must clear constitutional hurdles in the United
States as well.
C. Balancing Individual Privacy and the Needs of Law
Enforcement
The era of the Internet has only augmented the concerns for
individual privacy, which have been escalating over the last half-
century. Fighting crime has always required balancing constitu-
tional rights of individuals against the need to detect and deter
American Marine Underwriters, 454 F. Supp. 198, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
81. See Keller, supra note 73, at 1601.
82. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
83. 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
84. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. at 350 (1903), quoting Pensacola Tel., 96 U.S.
at 9.
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criminal endeavors. The new technologies provide greater threats
to privacy, but, ironically, can provide greater barriers to law
enforcement's ability to collect vital information.
When a consumer wishes to make an on-line purchase, he
typically opens an account with an electronic money issuer by
purchasing tokens, coins or coupons, which are encoded data
packets that represent an agreed-upon amount of currency. When
the consumer makes the purchase from the merchant, the consumer
downloads the tokens from his computer to that of the merchant,
who then forwards the tokens to their issuer, who verifies them and
credits the appropriate amount to the merchant's account.85 While
electronic money and the burgeoning e-commerce are quick and
convenient, they implicate serious privacy concerns. Legitimate
consumers and merchants need an Internet economic financial
system that provides them with security, and that shields their
personal information from prying eyes.'
Counterbalancing legitimate privacy interests is the need for a
trail, traceable by law enforcement, to ensure that the criminal
elements do not have the privilege of committing crimes in
undiscoverable anonymity.' Currently, "cyber-banking" allows the
anonymous transfers of large sums of money, without triggering the
reporting requirements that have proven effective in slowing the
money laundering process. By privately transferring funds on-line,
criminals are able to bypass the traditional financial institutions
with built-in procedures that discourage money laundering, and
85. See Michael A. Fixler, Note, Cyberfinance: Regulating Banking on the
Internet, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 81, 85-86 (1996); Catherine M. Downey,
Comment, The High Price of a Cashless Society: Exchanging Privacy Rights for
Digital Cash?, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 303, 306-7 (1996); Ellen
d'Alelio, Doing Business in the New World of Electronic Commerce: An
Introduction to the Emerging Electronic Payment Products and Systems, DOING
BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET 63, 70 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series PLI Order No. G4-4024, 1997).
86. See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living
with Anonymity, Digital Cash and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & CoM. 395, 460
(1996); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Legal and Technological Infrastructrues for
Electronic Payment Systems, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (1996).
87. See Joshua B. Konvisser, Note, Coins, Notes and Bits: The Case for Legal
Tender on the Internet, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 349 (1997); Nicholas W. Allard
& David A. Kass, Law and Order in Cyberspace: Washington Report, 19 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 563, 605 (1997); Jonathan I. Edelstein, Note, Anonymity and
International Law Enforcement in Cyberspace, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 231, 255-63 (1996).
88. See Sultzer, supra note 2, at 195.
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alert law enforcement officials to the possible commission of a
crime.'
An added difficulty in the privacy issues application across
international boundaries is the difference between United States
and European nations regarding the privacy of on-line information.
The United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation is able to use
"black box" surveillance systems that monitor and sort e-mail
messages only after a search warrant is obtained.' In contrast, the
British government is on the verge of passing new legislation that
would allow the government to monitor electronic communications
for a variety of reasons, including national security interests, the
protection of the country's "well-being," and to detect and prevent
serious crime.9' This legislation does not require that warrants for
such monitoring come from judges; rather, a range of officials,
including high-ranking police officials can sign them.9' Amnesty
International in London has charged that this legislation
"contravene[s] a large number of fundamental rights in the
European convention on human rights and other international
standards, which include the right to privacy, the right to liberty, the
right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of
association."93 While the British appear to have tipped the scales in
favor of law enforcement, legitimate privacy concerns must be
safeguarded, without jeopardizing law enforcement's ability to
police effectively. Again, reaching an agreement for international
cooperation will prove essential.
Traditional constitutional privacy hurdles would be raised if
the British proposal was made in the United States. The test, as
applied to privacy where it is construed as a fundamental right
requires three steps. First, is there a reasonable expectation of
privacy? Second, is there a compelling state interest? Third, if
there is a compelling interest under reasonable expectation, was the
regulation of the interest done in the least intrusive manner?
One could conclude that a rationally drafted measure
monitoring Internet gambling could survive this test. First, an
individual arguably may not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy when gambling on the Internet. Further, the government
89. See John J. Byrne, FATF Typologies Focus on Emerging Laundering
Trends, MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP., Aug. 1996 at 1, 4.
90. See Sarah Lyall, British Authorities May Get Wide Power to Decode E-
Mail, N.Y. TIMES, INT'L at A3 (July 19, 2000).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Id.
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could show a compelling interest in identifying money laundering
activities at a place it occurs frequently: Internet casinos. Finally, a
reporting requirement for identifying the size and scope of
transactions would probably satisfy the reasonable requirement by
being the least restrictive means of regulating this. Therefore,
arguably legislation requiring information that should identify
money laundering through Internet casinos could survive a
constitutional privacy test.
III. Regulation and Enforcement: Gambling, the Internet and
Dirty Money
The issues raised above necessitate creating an overall legal
framework to control money laundering done through Internet
gambling operations. First, it is essential to determine the ultimate
objective of such legal changes; in other words, to establish whether
the focus on preventing or regulating Internet gambling is done
with the end goal of preventing money laundering.
A. Regulation of Traditional Gambling Establishments
Until 1976, the majority of the fifty states found the economic
benefits of legalized gambling outweighed by the concomitant
social ills.' Opponents of gambling argue that gambling increases
crime, generates economic losses and diminishes morality. They
further argue that gambling has historic ties to organized crime, and
disproportionately harms the lower socio-economic strata.95
Nonetheless, many communities have legalized gambling in pursuit
of jobs and revenues.'
Under the federal system of governance in the United States,
the policy decisions relating to allowing or prohibiting gambling
have generally been part of the states' constitutional police powers.
In recognition of this division of authority, and the Tenth Amend-
ment (according to its current interpretation), the 1976 Commission
on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling proposed
that the individual state governments decide the extent to which
94. See Valley Broad. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328, 1331-32 (9th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied 522 U.S. 1115 (1998); Players Int'l v. United States, 988 F. Supp. 497,
502 (D.N.J. 1997).
95. See JEROME SKOLNICK, HOUSE OF CARDS 101-118 (1978); Thomas L.
Hazen, Public Policy: Rational Investments, Speculation or Gambling? -
Derivatives Securities and Financial Futures and their Effect on the Underlying
Capital Markets, 86 NW U. L. REv. 987, 1005 n. 91 (1992).
96. See Jon Bigness, Companies Place Bets on Internet Gambling, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 25, 1997, at 1, 4.
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gambling would be legalized within their borders.'2 Until recently,
this arrangement has proved largely satisfactory, as traditional
gambling operations were confinable within the territorial bounds
of their host state.98
As counterpoint to the states' authority over the general
welfare of their citizens, the national government has retained the
power to regulate commerce among the states.99 While the states
generate the bulk of the regulations regarding gambling, Congress,
under the aegis of its Commerce Clause powers, intercedes when
the gambling in one state has a substantial affect on another.1 0
Since 1827, Congress has exercised its authority to prevent one
state from using means of interstate commerce to surmount the
barriers against gambling erected by some, but not all, states.01
While these federal attempts at strengthening and protecting state
laws regarding gambling have been subjected to numerous
challenges, they have been uniformly upheld as legitimate
expressions of Congress' Commerce Clause power."" Even
traditional gambling has been subject to federal jurisdiction under
the Commerce Clause and the reach of federal authority appears
even greater when the Internet is involved.
B. Internet Gambling Complications
The Commerce Clause prevents a state from implementing a
policy that is national in scope or that "burdens" interstate
commerce.1 3 Previous attempts by states to protect local business
interests at the expense of out-of-state commerce have been
disallowed. 4
97. See 1976 Gambling Commission at 172.
98. See Stevie A. Kish, Note, Betting on the Net: An Analysis of the
Government's Role in Addressing Internet Gambling, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 449, 454
(1999).
99. See id. at 457.
100. See id.
101. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421 (1993).
102. See Keller, supra note 73, at 1584.
103. However, the Fourth Amendment does not require that a warrantless
search be founded upon probable cause; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), held that
reasonable suspicion may be sufficient.
103. See Kenneth D. Bassinger, Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on
State Regulation of the Internet: The Transportation Analogy, 32 GA. L. REV. 889,
920-22 (1998); David Post, Gambling on Internet Laws, AM. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 97
(the Dormant Commerce Clause requires national resolution of Internet gambling
issues).
104. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (Illinois was
unable to require trucks passing through the state to use specially contoured mud
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Recently, a New York federal district court considered the
intersection of the Dormant Commerce Clause, state law and the
Internet, and struck down New York's Internet Indecency Act,0 5
which sought to prevent sexually explicit communications with a
minor over the Internet. The court found "that the Internet is
analogous to a highway or railroad," and that "the phrase 'inform-
ation superhighway'... [is] more than a mere buzzword; it has legal
significance, because the similarity between the Internet and more
traditional instruments of interstate commerce leads to analysis
under the Commerce Clause."1 6 Of significance here is the court's
conclusion that state-by-state regulation of the Internet "highlights
the likelihood that a single actor might be subject to haphazard,
uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation by states
that the actor never intended to reach and possibly was unaware
were being accessed."1 7 In establishing that the Internet should be
regulated at the federal, and not state, level, the court held that
"the Internet is one of those areas of commerce that must be
marked off as a national preserve to protect users from inconsistent
legislation that, taken to its most extreme, could paralyze
development of the Internet altogether.'1 '
Federal and international authorities are the proper regulatory
bodies for most Internet policies' 9 Not only does regulation at
such levels side-step the Commerce Clause concerns, but the
federal government is better able to fashion solutions that are
acceptable to, and hence more likely to be enforced by, other
sovereigns. On the practical level, the national government's
financial and infrastructure support for the creation and rapid
expansion of the Internet reinforces its regulatory authority."'
Most commentators agree that national and international regula-
tion avoids one of the most costly consequences of redundant and
conflicting regulation by each local power, the inability of Internet
sites to comply, in a cost-effective manner, with the myriad
fragmented rules and policies."'
flaps); Seaboard Air Line Ry. V. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917) (Georgia cannot
require trains to stop and blow their whistles at every grade crossing in the state).
105. N.Y. Penal § 235.21(3) (McKinney 1998).
106. American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
107. See id at 168-169.
10& See id.
109. See Steven R. Salbu, Article, Who Should Govern the Internet?:
Monitoring and Supporting a New Frontier, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 457
(1998).
110. See id.
111. See id at 439, 458-459.
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Irrespective of jurisdiction, the greatest difficulties occur when
drafting an enforceable policy. The technology of the Internet and
the international nature of its' use make regulation by states, or
even nations, very difficult. The simplicity of Internet gambling
makes regulation complex. Currently, it is easy and convenient to
place an on-line bet. Any individual with access to the Internet can
run a key word search, using a search engine, and, after selecting
the web site that looks most promising, stare Lady Luck in the face,
even if the on-line gambling provider is located in a host nation
thousands of miles from that of the would-be gambler. New visitors
to the site open an account, usually with a minimum deposit, before
they begin placing bets or playing other games of chance. The site
operators usually require that the account be funded from wired
funds, money orders or with a credit card. When the gambler wins,
he must trust that the on-line casino will indeed deposit his
winnings in his account or send them to him by money order or
wire transfer."'
The policy quandary is how to prevent Internet gambling from
being used as a tool of money launderers without creating clumsy
or unenforceable regulations governing Internet transactions.
Clearly, some jurisdictions are willing and ready to accommodate
Internet gambling, thus adding to the complexity of finding a
workable solution. It must be asked whether it is possible to
prevent money laundering through Internet casinos without the
cooperation of every nation in the world.
While debating and drafting policies, agencies seeking to place
limits on Internet gambling providers must carefully balance the
desire of states and nations to collect revenue from this lucrative
industry against both the traditional vices associated with gambling,
and the new advantages that the Internet, and especially Internet
gambling, offers to criminals."3 While on-line gambling will create
jobs, the number will be relatively low, and the majority of new
hires will be HTML and other computer programmers, who,
arguably, could put their skills to better use."4 Moreover, although
proponents of traditional gambling establishments can argue that
the harms wrought by such easy access to games of chance are
compensated for by revenue generated, in the on-line arena
"private Internet gambling, in any form, will result in a net loss for
112. See Hogan, supra note 4, at 821-823.
113. See Craig, supra note 43, at 62.
114. See id. at 68-69.
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the state."...5 Not only will Internet sites harm state lottery and pari-
mutual endeavors, and their accompanying revenues, but the state,
in all likelihood, will not be able to collect taxes on the Internet
gambling revenues themselves, as the Internet gaming operators
have already located themselves in more tax-friendly nations. At
the same time, the ease and broad accessibility of on-line casinos
will increase the number of gamblers, and correlatively, the number
of gambling addicts, and thus place a further drain on the
government."
C. Old Game, New Location: Gambling On-Line May Be Illegal
Now
While the technicalities of gambling differ significantly
between the lavish gaming houses in Las Vegas and Atlantic City,
and at the on-line gaming sites on the Internet, the act of gambling
or wagering is the same. Gambling is an activity that should be
unaffected, legally, by the medium in which it occurs; "for the
purposes of federal antigambling laws, it is the 1990s equivalent of
using the telephone to play the numbers or place bets.""..8  The
bottom line is that on-line gambling does not require a
fundamentally new, or different, legal regime9
The United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York believes that Internet gambling operators are in violation of
federal antigambling laws, even when they have located their
operations offshore, and has filed prosecutions against more than
twenty Internet sports gambling sites, alleging that they are in
violation of the Wire Wager Act." The complaints filed contain
descriptions of the "ubiquitous" contacts these sites have with U.S.
citizens, as well as how the transactions between the site and U.S.
citizens strongly parallel gambling transactions previously con-
ducted over the telephone, or through the mail. 2' In agreement
with New York, Internet gambling should be considered as firmly
115. Id.
116. See ROBERT GOODMAN, THE LUCK BUSINESS 42-51 (1995; Nelson Rose,
The Legalization and Control of Casino Gambling, 8 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 245, 245
n. 1 (1980).
117. See id.
118. See I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U.
Pinr. L. REV. 993-1000 (1994). Although some acts are unique to cyberspace, the
"Internet presents no new legal issues when it is being used 'simply [as] a medium
of direct communication between people - much like the telephone, mail or fax."'
119. See Keller, supra note 73, at 1573.
120. Keller, supra note 43, at 1574; 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994).
121. See id. at 1574.
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within the purview of the federal government, and subject to the
existing federal gambling regulations and prohibitions."'
Upon a closer examination of the mechanics of Internet
gambling, arguably it is merely a "new-media imitation" of that
which has already been proscribed under federal law, and
therefore, on-line gambling should be as tractable to the regulations
that forbid gambling over the telephone, through the mail or by fax.
These laws include the Interstate Wire Act,'23 the Travel Act,"4 and
the Crime Control Act.
125
Of the applicable statutes to the Internet gambling operator,
the Interstate Wire Act (IWA) has sparked the most interest
because, in its breadth, it expressly prohibits the use of a wire
transmission facility to carry on a gambling business.126 Section (a)
of the Act provides that "Whoever being engaged in the business of
betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility
for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or
wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on
any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or
credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in
the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both."'27  Section (d)
further provides that a common carrier who is "'subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission' can be
compelled to discontinue, disconnect, or refuse service to any
facility that is violating the Wire Act upon receiving notice of such
violation from any federal, state, or local law enforcement
agency.""
Internet casino operations are in violation of each of the four
elements of the Act. The state must first establish that the Internet
casinos are "in the business of' betting. In United States v.
Baborian,'29 the court concluded that "any bookmaking operation
that takes bets" is "engaged in the business of betting." Under this
generous definition, the on-line casinos that receive bets from
122. See id.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1997).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1997).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1997).
126. See Keller, supra note 43, at 1580.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1997).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(d) (1997).
129. 528 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D.R.I. 1981).
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gamblers satisfy this element. The second requirement is that the
Internet casino "knowingly use a wire communication facility to
transmit bets.' 3° Under the IWA, any interstate use of telephone
or telex lines for the transmission of gambling information is
prohibited. 3' The third element is that the Internet casinos use the
Internet to transmit bets in interstate commerce; this is, by
definition, satisfied so long as the casino operator receives bets
from individuals in different states or nations.'32 The final element
requires that one of the two parties to the wager or bet, the Internet
casino or the gambler, receive either money or credit from the
outcome of the bet.' The nature of gambling is such that one party
will win, and this requirement is satisfied regardless of which party
is the winner.
The Interstate Wire Act prohibits more than just the placing
and receiving of bets, however, and criminalizes the transmission of
any information that makes it possible to place a bet."3 It does not
matter whether the bet is actually placed in a state or nation that
allows that form of gambling. The House Report on this Act
stressed that "nothing in the exemption, however, will permit the
transmission of bets and wagers or money by wire as a result of a
bet or wager from or to any State whether betting is legal in that
state or not."'' The conclusion to be drawn from this statement is
that "the literal language of 1084 condemns all Internet trans-
missions to the United States of the digitized bits of information
that create the virtual gambling site on a user's computer screen.'
136
This act seems tailor-made to apply to Internet gambling.
However, the language of this Act appears self-contradictory.
It places a specific prohibition on the transmission of "information
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or
contest," as well as a more general prohibition against "the trans-
mission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers" and
"information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers.""' 7 While
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1997).
131. See I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law, REPLAY MAG., 46, July 1995.
132. See id. at 46.
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1997).
134. See Keller, supra note 73, at 1581.
135. H.R. REP. No. 87-967 at 3 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631.
136. Keller, supra note 73, at 1582; see also United States v. Reeder, 614 F.2d
1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1980).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1997).
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the argument can be made that this Act only applies to bets or
wagers on sports-related events, it is a weak argument in light of the
House and Senate Reports on the Act.' These reports reference
"bets and wagers" without a sport-related limitation, and it is
unlikely that Congress intentionally excluded the numbers racket
from its prohibition.'39 Any confusion could be remedied by
amendment, such as the proposed Internet Gambling Prohibition
Act. This Act, despite any linguistic imprecision, "seems tailor-
made for application to Internet gambling."'°
The Travel Act.' has also been used to prosecute organized
gambling and may be well suited to Internet gambling operations as
well. 142 Under this Act, it is illegal to "travel in interstate or foreign
commerce or use of the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce with the intent to perform an unlawful activity, which
includes any business enterprise involving gambling ....,143
The court in United States v. Lightfoot'" explained that the
purpose of the Travel Act is to enable the federal government to
prosecute members of organized crime and supply local law
enforcement with federal assistance when fighting criminal
activities that extend beyond the state borders. Of importance to
the Internet gambling debate is the conclusion that the court
reached in United States v. Smith,'4' where it held that the Travel
Act can be used to prosecute interstate gambling conducted over
the telephone wires because the wires transmitted the data (the
voices of the gamblers) in the same manner that physical goods are
moved across the ground. The court found that the telephonic
"voice packets" of gambling information violated the Travel Act.
The Internet analogy is logical. The "transportation of data packets
involving gambling information over the Internet is as clear a
violation of the Travel Act as are the voices in Smith. '47
13& See H.R. REP. No. 87-967, at 2-4 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2631; S. REP. No. 87-588, at 2-5 (1961).
139. See TIMOTHY L. O'BRIEN, BAD BET: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
GLAMOUR, GLITZ, AND DANGER OF AMERICA'S GAMBLING INDUSTRY 4 (1998).
140. Keller, supra note 73, at 1584.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1997).
142. See Craig, supra note 43, at 81.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1997).
144. 506 F.2d 238, 240-241 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
145. See Lightfoot, 506 F.2d at 240-241.
146. 209 F. Supp. 907, 916 (E.D. I11. 1962).
147. Craig, supra note 43, at 82.
[Vol. 19:1
INTERNET CASINOS
The Crime Control Act 48 provides a final illustration of
applicable existing legislation. Congress has proscribed the
operation of an "illegal gambling business" and broadly defines
such as business as any gambling business that is in "violation of the
law of a State... in which it is conducted," that involves at least
five people, and that "has been or remains in substantially
continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a
gross revenue of $2000 in any single day.', 14 9
Significantly, the Crime Control Act does not necessitate a
state court conviction of the casino operators."0 In addition to the
elements listed above, the only other requirement is that the
gambling business violates some state law, "no matter how
trivial."'5' The proof requirements associated with this Act are
minimal; the government only has to prove that at least five people
(not even the same five people), at all times during a thirty day
period, conducted the illegal gambling activity.5 ' Moreover, the
participation of these individuals does not have to relate to the
actual gambling; it is sufficient that they are considered "necessary
and helpful" to the operation. 3 The thirty day requirement will be
satisfied if there is a "repeated pattern of gambling activity.""11
4
These statutes seem adequately sweeping to ensnare the
Internet gambling operators if they do business in the United
States. The casino itself will have taken enough steps to knowingly
engage in commercial transactions with United States citizens for
jurisdiction to be clearly established. Further, legal authority under
the previously mentioned acts may be sufficient to find criminal
liability. Yet, the difficulty lies in discovering the illegal Internet
gamble in the first place. The anonymity and secrecy surrounding
the Internet, especially when money is involved, have presented
unprecedented challenges to the law enforcement community
worldwide. Finally, under the above laws, the casino, not the
launderer, is the criminal. So, the goal to now be pursued, based on
the above laws, is to shut down, or prevent, one means of money
laundering where there is a connection to the United States.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994).
149. Id.
150. See United States v. Murray, 928 F.2d 1242, 1245 (1st Cir. 1991).
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1) (1994).
152. See id.
153. See United States v. DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503, 508 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
154. See United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 843 (7th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Allen, 588 F.2d 1100, 1104 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965
(1979).
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IV. The Advantages of New Legislation
A. The Internet Gambling Prohibition Act: Promises and Problems
Congress, seeking to make certain that Internet gambling is
illegal, considered specific legislation this year. In the 106th
Congress, both the Senate and the House of Representatives
considered a version of the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of
1999.155 This proposed amendment to the Interstate Wire Act'56
would have made it "unlawful for any person engaged in a
gambling business to knowingly use the Internet or any other
interactive computer service to: (1) place, receive or otherwise
make a bet or wager; or (2) send, receive, or invite information
assisting in the placing of a bet or wager."'' 7 The amendment would
change the Interstate Wire Act in two important ways. First, it
would remove the limiting language in the Wire Act that
criminalizes only the use of interstate wire communication facilities
for sports betting, and create a much broader federal prohibition
against almost any form of Internet gambling.' Second, the
amendment would authorize federal law enforcement officials to
seek injunctive relief against any Internet service provider who
knowingly receives or transmits either a bet or wager, or
information that assists in placing a bet or wager.19
Although the bill is championed by some as the best solution
to the growing Internet gambling industry, there are several
criticisms of this particular proposal. While the amendment carved
out exceptions for certain State lotteries and authorized horse and
dog racing, critics of the bill said that it infringed on states' rights by
preventing state lotteries from offering in-state sales of lottery
tickets over the Internet. 16°  Rep. Patrick Kennedy, D-R.I.,
appeared relieved that the bill failed, as it did not provide adequate
protection to state lotteries, which he considered "perhaps the best
form of gambling we have out there, in that they are giving
legitimate dollars to our states.'
161
155. See H.R. 3125, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 692, 106th Cong. (1999).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1997).
157. Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999, H.R. 3125, 106th Congress
(1999).
158. See H.R. 3125, supra note 155.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. House Deals E-gambling Bill Losing Hand, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 18,
2000).
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Another issue is that the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Reno v. ACL U 62 raises First Amendment concerns regarding a
federal ban on Internet gambling.1 63 Under the current version of
the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999, states would not be
allowed to permit their citizens to gamble over the Internet even if
all transactions occurred entirely intrastate. 64 However, the
language in Reno may indicate that Congress cannot treat Internet
gambling as "merely a vice activity that is undeserving of any First
Amendment protection,' ' 65 and thus, some argue that a complete
ban on all wagering activities over the Internet might not withstand
a constitutional challenge. However, the Interstate Wire Act
already permits law enforcement authorities to compel common
carriers to discontinue service to any facility whose service is used
for "the purpose of transmitting or receiving gambling information
in interstate or foreign commerce in violation of federal, state or
local law... ." Since 1961, the courts have upheld this section of
the statute against all constitutional challenges. As currently
written, the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999 would
merely extend the reach of the Interstate Wire Act to include the
"interactive computer service provider[s] .''67
A final comment regarding any new proposals is relevant.
Without the means to monitor, detect and prevent illegal trans-
actions, i.e. without effective enforcement, these new laws would be
merely a national moral proclamation.
B. Reporting Requirements: Detection and Deterrence
Under current technologies, it is impossible to register a
domain name or set up a Web site anonymously.'6M Money, the root
of the problem with on-line gambling operations, is, ironically, the
saving grace; the registration services and Internet service providers
require reliable billing information in exchange for their services.' 69
This billing information connects a cyberspace entity with a
concrete, geographical existence, and provides law enforcement
162. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
163. See id.
164. H.R. 3125, supra note 155.
165. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Kish, supra note 98, at 451.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(d) (1997).
167. H.R. 3125, supra note 155.
168. See Keller, supra note 73, at 1606.
169. See id.; see, generally, Network Solutions, Inc.'s Domain Name
Registration Policies. The name, address, phone, fax and e-mail address of an
"administrative contact" is required from each registrant.
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with the beginning of a paper trail. These "footprints" make the
Internet gambling operators susceptible to traditional law enforce-
ment investigations and prosecutions, including sting operations
and sham accounts opened by undercover operatives. As one
writer succinctly put it: "Always follow the money.'
' 7
'
To maximize efficiency, a federal agency could be charged with
creating and maintaining a "Master List" of all web sites known for
or suspected of permitting on-line wagering.7 1 Search engines and
indices are effective tools for discovering these operations, as the
operators need customers in order to survive and are thus locatable
to those searching.173 After searching for illicit gambling web sites,
law enforcement authorities can require service providers to
provide the identifying information they have, and the authorities
have the option of following the paper trail and prosecuting on the
basis of available information, or they can direct the service
provider to block access to that site, thus shutting down the criminal
operation. Both options, however, require international coopera-
tion if Internet gambling operations are not to be available to
criminals for large-scale money laundering.
Fortunately, law enforcement investigators and investigative
technologies have not fallen behind the criminals.'74 The FBI and
state law enforcement have conducted joint sting operations on the
Internet that have generated sufficient evidence to arrest dozens of
on-line wrong-doers."5  State attorneys general offices, the
Securities Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion have also been successful in monitoring and prosecuting
Internet fraud schemes.176 These investigative forces have proven
that law enforcement is able, and determined, to remain abreast of
the emerging sophisticated technologies, in order to apply the law
170. See Dominic Bencivenga, Internet Cyberforce: SEC and FTC Crack Down
on On-line Fraud, N.Y. L. J., Sept. 3, 1998, at 5; David Johnston, Use of Computer
Network for Child Sex Sets off Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1995, at Al.
171. See Bencivenga, supra note 170, at 5.
172. See Craig, supra note 43, at 96.
173. See id.
174. See, generally, Johnston, supra note 170.
175. See Christopher Wolf & Scott Shorr, Cybercops are, Cracking Down on
Internet Fraud, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 13, 1997, at B12. (Here, the agents successfully
posed on-line as minors, and were able to arrest dozens of on-line child
pornographers).
176. See Bencivenga, supra note 170, at 5 (The SEC employs over 100
attorneys, analysts and accountants who are specially trained to detect and
investigate cyber-crime. The FTC has similarly trained over 300); Wolf & Shorr,
supra note 175, at B12.
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to all criminals.177 Money launderers using the Internet are still real
people, with "real names, real addresses and telephone numbers
and they want their money.. ,."" Since the act of laundering
money is itself illegal, and since illegally acquired proceeds are
always illegal, following the money is still a smart policy for crime
prevention."'
V. Conclusory Thoughts and Options
In the United States, citizens have a right to privacy
interpreted from the federal Constitution, as well as some state
constitutions against government intrusion. To their advantage,
they are able to enjoy the rights provided by whichever source
provides the better protection. In Florida, one of the most
generous states, vis a vis a right to privacy, the test, the same basin
test used for the federal fundamental rights, is: (1) In this setting, or
for this activity, is there a reasonable expectation of privacy? (2) In
this setting, or for this activity, does the state have a compelling
interest in monitoring, regulating or limiting it? and (3) Was the
government's means the least intrusive available?
When applied to the Internet, citizens would appear to have a
right to privacy against government intrusion. However, whether
there is a compelling state interest depends on the actual
circumstances. For example, the government has a proven interest
in prosecuting child pornographers that use the Internet to ensnare
unwitting victims. In large measure, the government's interest in
regulating activities on the Internet parallel their interest in those
same activities when they are conducted in the "real" world.
The government has maintained a high level of regulatory
interest in and control over the gambling industry in the United
States. The casinos are monitored for fairness, as well as to prevent
money laundering. The streets around the casinos are patrolled in
order to prevent derivative crimes. There exists a compelling state
interest in regulating the gambling industry. This interest does not
diminish when the gambling occurs over the Internet; in fact, the
government's concerns are magnified. The government has a fully
justified interest in preventing the on-line casinos from becoming
the conduit through which millions, and perhaps, if not checked,
billions, of dollars are laundered.
177. See Keller, supra note 73, at 1607.
178. Bencivenga, supra note 170, at 5, quoting Jodie Bernstein, Director, FTC
Bureau of Consumer Protection.
179. See id.
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Although only one of the three prongs of the privacy test must
be satisfied in order for the state to lose a privacy test with respect
to a given activity, Internet gambling should fails all prongs. There
is no reasonable expectation of privacy when a gambler enters a
casino in Las Vegas or Atlantic City. The ceiling is teeming with
hidden cameras and the casino floor supports many employee-
observers. Both the casino and the government take steps to
monitor the patrons and the goings-on in a gambling institution.
Since the same activity occurs on-line, the same justifications exist
for monitoring the actions of the house and the gambler, and may
be even stronger, based on money laundering activities.
The activity of on-line gambling cannot satisfy any part of the
privacy test; there is not a reasonable expectation of privacy when
gambling, and the state should have a compelling interest in
preventing money laundering and other financial crimes. So long as
the regulations are least intrusive, they are constitutional. In light
of this, so long as any gambling sites are accessible on the World
Wide Web, the government should be granted the ability to reason-
ably monitor Internet casino sites and to compel disclosure
paralleling the non-Internet environment.
VI. The Constitution and Human Rights
A. The Privacy Conundrum
An overview of privacy concerns relating to the emerging
world of cyber finance reveals the quandary facing policy makers.
Private citizens wishing to engage in commercial transactions over
the Internet need a secure communication format that prevents
third parties from viewing their sensitive personal financial inform-
ation without their consent. These third parties include would-be
criminals and over-zealous marketers, as well as the government.
Without a guarantee of a minimum modicum of privacy, the rapid
expansion of Internet commerce will be slowed. On-line merchants
have recognized this and most of the larger retailers doing business
on the Internet have a privacy or security statement designed to
reassure users that any financial or personal information released to
the site will remain confidential.
When a consumer wishes to make an on-line purchase, he
typically opens an account with an electronic money issuer by
purchasing tokens, coins or coupons, which are encoded data
packets that represent an agreed upon amount of currency. When
the consumer makes the purchase from the merchant, the consumer
[Vol. 19:1
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downloads the tokens from his computer to that of the merchant,
who then forwards the tokens to their issuer, who verifies them and
credits the appropriate amount to the merchant's account.8 While
electronic money and the burgeoning e-commerce are quick and
convenient, they implicate serious privacy concerns. Legitimate
consumers and merchants need an Internet economic financial
system that provides them with security, and that shields their
personal information from prying eyes."'
As counterpoint to the consumers' insistence on security in on-
line financial transactions, the law enforcement community has an
equally legitimate need for information in order to carry out their
mandate to detect, deter and prosecute crimes. In the "real" world,
most transactions leave a "trail," usually made of paper. When a
money launderer begins to churn his illegal profits, there is often a
record of the funds entering one business or account, and another
showing where it was deposited after being removed. The process
of layering may be confusing and tangled, but there is frequently a
record of the events. The era of the Internet has only augmented
the concerns for individual privacy, which have been escalating over
the last half-century. Fighting crime has always required balancing
constitutional rights of individuals against the need to detect and
deter criminal endeavors. The new technologies provide greater
threats to privacy, but, ironically, can provide greater barriers to
law enforcement's ability to collect vital information.
Currently, "cyber-banking" allows the anonymous transfers of
large sums of money, without triggering the reporting requirements
that have proven effective in slowing the money laundering
process."' By transferring funds on-line, criminals are able to
bypass the traditional financial institutions that have built-in
procedures that discourage money laundering, and alert law
enforcement officials to the possible commission of a crime.'83
On the Internet, however, it is possible to conduct business in
complete anonymity. While this may be an attractive feature to
libertarians, one must ask whether such complete secrecy benefits
anyone other than criminals. In light of the unprecedented
magnitude of on-line money laundering, especially through Internet
gambling operations, the anonymity that is currently possible only
180. See Bryan S. Schultz, Electronic Money, Internet Commerce, and the Right
to Financial Privacy: A Call for New Federal Guidelines, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 779,
785 (1999).
181. See id.
182. See Sultzer, supra note 2, at 195.
183. See Byrne, supra note 89, at 4.
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on the Internet may not be desirable. While security and privacy
features must exist in order to promote cyber commerce, there is a
compelling argument against allowing any more heightened
features than currently exist and are used for similar transactions in
the paper world.
While such a proposal to limit the security and degree of
anonymity available on the Internet will be controversial, it is
obvious that while many law-abiding individuals may wish to hide
in cyberspace, it is only the criminals who have the most to lose by
such a provision, as they will no longer be able to completely hide
their actions from the light of day.
Compounding the situation are the fundamental differences
that currently exist between the United States and European
nations regarding the privacy of on-line information. The United
States' Federal Bureau of Investigation is able to use "black box"
surveillance systems that monitor and sort e-mail messages only
after a search warrant is obtained.' However, the British govern-
ment is on the verge of passing new legislation that would allow the
government to monitor electronic communications for a variety of
reasons, including national security interests, the protection of the
country's "well-being," and to detect and prevent serious crime.
However, this legislation does not require that warrants for such
monitoring come from judges; rather, they can be signed by a range
of officials, including high-ranking police officials.1" Amnesty
International in London has charged that this legislation
"contravene[s] a large number of fundamental rights in the
European convention on human rights and other international
standards, which include the right to privacy, the right to liberty, the
right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of
association.. 1 7 While the British appear to have tipped the scales in
favor of law enforcement, legitimate privacy concerns must be
safeguarded, without jeopardizing law enforcement's ability to
police effectively. Again, reaching an agreement for international
cooperation will prove essential, and probably just as elusive.
B. Freedom of Expression
In addition to the concerns of the right to privacy, the
individual's freedom of expression may be implicated as well. The
184. See Lyall, supra note 90, at A3.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
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availability of other "vices" on-line have been the targets of
regulation. An example of regulation of national and international
Internet commerce, which failed constitutional muster, is the
Communications Decency Act of 1996. The United States Supreme
Court held that the Act was unconstitutionally vague, failed to use
the least intrusive means to regulate child pornography on the
Internet, and thereby violated the First Amendment's Freedom of
Speech.
The characteristics of the Internet were critical to the Court's
holding. The Court acknowledged that the Internet is unique.188 No
single organization controls the web, nor is there a centralized point
to block communications.'89 It is currently impossible to determine
the identity or authoritative information of a user of a site without
requesting the information from that party."9
The current conclusion that speech on the Internet is more
protected than either radio or television airwaves, which are
publicly regulated.' 91 Regulation of mass communication is medium
specific and the Internet is the most participatory form of mass
speech yet developed, and is entitled to the "highest protection
from governmental intrusion."" Currently restrictions on Internet
vices can fail constitutional tests.
C. 4th Amendment Concerns
A final concern that must be addressed before solutions can be
sought and policies implemented is that of the constitutional
protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures"; this safe-
guard requires that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."'193
In the context of money laundering through Internet casinos, the
primary issue is not whether the law enforcement agencies are
technologically capable of engaging in surveillance of such on-line
entities, but when, and under what circumstances, may they legally
monitor the presumably legitimate transactions of a legal
business."
188. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 9.
189. See id at 10.
190. See id at 12.
191. See id at Syllabus 6.
192. See id at 17.
193. U.S. CONST. amend IV (1791).
194. It is critical to this analysis to note that, as previously stated, almost all on-
line casinos are registered and operated from outside the jurisdictional boundaries
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In general, a warrant is required before a search occurs, unless
there are "exigent circumstances," and any such search must not be
6'unreasonable." The Fourth Amendment requires that before a
judge or magistrate may issue a search warrant, he must be satisfied
that probable cause to do so exists. The warrant must contain a
particular description of the premises to be searched and the things
to be seized. The Supreme Court has held that probable cause
must also exist before a warrantless search is made. For there to be
probable cause to search particular premises, "it must be more
likely than not that (a) the specific items to be searched for are
connected with criminal activities, and (b) these items will be found
in the place to be searched." Moreover, searches may be made of
the premises of persons who are not themselves criminal suspects, if
the law enforcement official, judge or magistrate has probable
cause to believe that the search will produce evidence of another
individual's crime.195
Health and safety inspections provide a parallel to the
inspections that law enforcement personnel would be interested in
conducting in the virtual casinos. The Supreme Court announced
the general rule in Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and
County of San Francisco, 19 6 that a search warrant is required before
an inspector can conduct a health or safety inspection. But, in
order to get a warrant for such an inspection, the inspector does not
have to have probable cause that a violation will be discovered
during the investigation; he must only show that the inspection is
part of a "general area" inspection and that these premises are not
being singled out. However, if a business is subject to special
stringent licensing rules, a warrantless search/inspection may be
allowed. For example, weapons dealers can be searched without a
warrant because the federal government requires a license for all
such dealers. This could be of particular value to law enforcement
officials seeking to monitor on-line casinos for money laundering
transactions if the legislature were to pass such "special stringent"
licensing rules.
of the United States. While it may indeed be possible to find that the U.S. has
jurisdiction over a particular web site that has engaged in repeated information
transfers with a citizen of the U.S., these offshore companies are not, in general,
subject to U.S. laws.
195. This will be especially useful in the on-line casino context, as the casino
may not have any role in the laundering of money, but may be an unwitting and
unknowing pawn.
196. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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Before the probable cause analysis can begin, there must first
be a statute that is potentially being violated. With an on-line
casino, there are several possibilities, but they are predicated upon
a finding that the business is subject to U.S. laws. Its operations
could well be in violation of the Wire Act or federal reporting
requirements, or it could be engaged in, or being used as a conduit
for, money laundering or other such obvious criminal endeavors. If
the law enforcement officials have a reasonable suspicion that the
web site operator is in violation of an applicable law, or is being
used to facilitate the commission of a crime, then they may be able
to begin observing the business for further evidence of a violation.
However, since the transactions with this enterprise are all on-line,
observation is much more complicated, legally and practically, than
setting up an observer across the street. In order to actually gain
useful information regarding the possible criminal activities of an
on-line casino, law enforcement would need to either observe each
transaction and discover the identity of the transacting parties, or
gain access to the casino's record books. While it is no doubt
technically possible for the government to monitor all transactions
the business engages in, Professor Baldwin reiterates emphatically
that it is not legal under U.S. law to monitor a lawful business for
compliance with a reporting requirement, which is the most
probable and easily detectable of the potential criminal violations
an on-line casino would commit. The only legal means of
monitoring a business' transactions is to first find probable cause
that the business is engaging in illegal activities and to obtain a
search warrant from a judge or magistrate. Moreover, the tech-
nological resources available from Carnivore are not available here
because that program is authorized only to investigate suspicious
e-mails.
A final note of importance is that the Kyle amendment, which
would enable law enforcement to search and monitor for exactly
such money laundering threats, has been defeated every time it has
been brought before the U.S. Congress for a vote.
VII. Options and Alternative Solutions
A. National Remedies and Limitations
In the battle against money laundering through the Internet,
there is the tremendous burden of coping with the fact that these
crimes are being committed on a world wide web, and hence, have
instantaneous global implications. But even with the lack of
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boundary lines on the Internet, the tendency may be for countries
to attempt to eradicate the problem within their own boundaries.
For example, while in Belgium and Denmark there are no specific
regulations regarding the dissemination of information relating to
securities on the Internet, in Sweden the Marketing Act sets
regulatory standards for all marketing regardless of media and
product."9 It is these wide range of diverging regulations that serve
to open the door for criminals to pick and choose the best arenas to
facilitate their crimes.
It is not realistic to expect one nation to eliminate a worldwide
problem. The Securities Exchange Commission in the United
States acknowledged this fact in 1998 when it issued the "Internet
Release. 19. Even though in 1999 alone, the SEC Division of
Enforcement doubled the size of its Internet surveillance team,
Cyberforce, from 125 to 250, and has been coordinating with the
FBI, CIA, the FTC, and the Secret Service in an effort to curb fraud
over the Internet,"9 the SEC still acknowledged that, as a "practical
matter," forcing all offshore on-line securities service providers to
register with the SEC would not be possible.2 00 The approach of the
SEC is that unless the Internet solicitation and offers on the
Internet are not "targeted" to the United States, then they are
beyond the boundaries of what they choose to be SEC
enforcement.2°' If a company takes measures to guard against sales
in the United States, then they are free from SEC enforcement .
In fact, it is "well recognized" that the Securities Exchange Act is
silent as to extraterritorial application.2 3
The SEC stance is that, "absent the transaction of business in
the United States or with U.S. persons, our interest in regulating
solicitation activity is less compelling."2" The SEC believes its focus
should be to encourage issuers of securities and financial service
197. See Nelson, Securities Law and the Internet: An International Perspective
on E-Commerce. 1188 PLI/Corp 449, 503-504 (2000). Additional examples of
countries with minimal or nonexistent regulations on business's use of the Internet
are Australia, Ireland, Greece, and The Netherlands. See Id.
198. See Securities Act Release No. 7516 (Mar. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Internet
Release].
199. See Quinn, Securities Regulation and the Use of Electronic Media, 1188
PLI/Corp 315, 349 (2000).
200. See Statement of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to
Offer Securities, Solicit Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services
Offshore. 1189 PLI/Corp 131, 135 (2000).
201. See Securities Act Release No. 7516 at 14807.
202. See id.
203. Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1995).
204. Securities Act Release No. 7516 at 14808.
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providers to implement precautionary measures that are reasonably
designed to ensure that offshore Internet offers are not targeted to
persons in the United States or to U.S. persons. 5 However, in an
attempt to draw this parallel to curbing money laundering on the
Internet, the shortcomings become very obvious very quickly.
If a country such as the United States were to take this
isolationist point of view in the area of Internet gambling, it would
do little to curb the abuses worldwide. Granted, perhaps fewer
citizens in the United States would be involved, and Internet
gambling sites would be more hesitant to solicit business from
people in the U.S. But this decision would just allow for a company
to set up sites, as has already occurred in Caribbean nations, and
permit accomplices to place bets laundering money from Canada.
While the SEC has chosen to not police securities fraud
offshore, the need to eliminate money laundering through the
Internet is compelling. As is demonstrated by the varying degrees
of enforcement that many countries currently have in the securities
regulation department, unless an international agreement is
reached, there will continue to be avenues of escape and loopholes
for the criminals of this world. While it is admirable that one nation
is willing to take steps to curb abuses in their own land, in the
broader scheme of things, these measures are insufficient. As the
Chairman of the Financial Services Authority of the United
Kingdom, Howard Davies, stated quite succinctly at his speech at
the Labour Party Conference of September 28, 1999, "we have to
find a way of adapting our regulatory environment to new
technology, not adapting the new technology to the old regulatory
rules.' ,21 In other words, the United States should not retreat to its'
own borders .in seeking to prevent money laundering.
Consequently, seeking international cooperation is central to the
success of the effort to prevent money laundering.
B. International Cooperation- Treaties
If we are to eradicate or deter the problem of money
laundering via Internet gambling, there must be an international
consensus on the proper means of reaching the goal. Because we
205. See id. Examples that the SEC envisions are the issuer's website including
a prominent and meaningful disclaimer making it clear that the offer is directed
only to countries other than the United States, or even going a step further and
taking measures to ensure that sales are not made to people in the U.S. by
blocking access to the offering materials.
206. Nelson, supra note 194, at 488.
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are dealing with the 'world-wide-web', a worldwide solution is
essential. The quandary arises, however, as to what exactly this
worldwide solution is going to be.
The first necessary step to officially proclaiming international
cooperation is a treaty. All members of the United Nations should
participate in an agreement that embodies the desired goal and
contains a means of enforcing this goal. Under the U.N. treaty, an
international police system would be instituted so that there would
be constant monitoring on the Internet to detect gambling sites that
were operating, and then pinpointing their location and taking the
necessary action provided for by the law. With the countries of the
U.N. bound together by treaty, their resources can be pooled,
thereby making it easier and more efficient to coordinate law
enforcement activities and personnel.
If the goal is to prosecute individual on-line gamblers, U.S. law
currently exists that allows prosecution of both the gambler and the
Internet casino. However, if the primary objective is to prevent on-
line casinos from being used as a conduit for laundering large sums
of illegally acquired profits, then laws that allow the government to
prosecute individual gamblers are of little value unless the govern-
ment can effectively track the gamblers who are also money
launderers. But as previously noted, the global nature of the
Internet will allow an individual anywhere in the world to access a
web site, and thus bypass any connection to just one nation.
Without a connection to a particular nation with a strong commit-
ment to defeating money laundering schemes, the transaction may
be beyond the reach of prosecutors. This is where an international
treaty that emphasizes a commitment to preventing and prosecuting
money launderers, wherever found, and wherever based, becomes
of paramount importance. In order to detect, and then prosecute,
money laundering through on-line casinos, the law enforcement
must be able to either monitor the businesses for suspicious
transactions, or periodically review their financial records for such
transactions. While this function is undoubtedly possible tech-
nologically, it must also be done legally, so that the evidence can be
the foundation of a conviction.
Thus, the international community should give priority to
strengthening anti-money laundering laws and to enabling inter-
national crime fighting agencies to effectively pursue evidence
against such activities. There should be a strong commitment to
sharing information and to facilitating extradition in order to make
the most effective use of the limited resources available for such
operations. Additionally, it must be remembered that in the end, at
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least one nation must have legal jurisdiction over the criminals and
must be able to arrest and prosecute them. The international
treaties should be designed with teeth sufficient to deter criminal
endeavors, but must also be cognizant of the particularities of
jurisdiction and due process so that evidence gathered will be
admissible.
C. Complete Ban vs. Licensing and Regulation
There are essentially two philosophies one can abide by in an
attempt to solve the problem. The first is to completely ban all
internet gambling sites. If there is not a means for which to launder
the money by, then the possibility of money laundering through the
internet will be unavailable to the criminal. A second approach is
to allow internet gambling sites to operate, but requiring all sites in
operation, and all future sites to register and become licensed to
operate. This would enable law enforcement authorities to keep
tabs on the sites that are legally registered, and would also assist
them in detecting those sites that are operating without a license.
Could the United States require sites to register and report activity
related to the United States? Probably, yes.
The problem then becomes how to stop these sites from
springing up anywhere in the world where a computer can be
connected and a phone line exists. Therefore the overall feasibility
of eliminating all gambling sites necessarily dictates a strong
consideration of the second option, licensing and regulation.
Arguably licensing is a more realistic approach, both in terms of
implementation and enforcement. But again, transnational coop-
eration would be essential. Therefore under a licensing arrange-
ment, if these pirate sites were to spring up, they would be more
easily detectable because they could be identified as unregistered
and flagged for lack of certification.
D. General Surveillance vs. Target Approach
Whichever tactic is eventually implemented, there must be a
means of enforcing the rule of law. Inextricably tied to the
registration approach is the strategy of general surveillance. Under
this method, the required registration could mandate lists of all
members who are gambling on the companies' sites, as well as
continuous reports of their transactions. A more limited approach
would be to require reporting of significant transaction and the
identity of those involved. While privacy concerns may be
implicated, a compelling government interest should justify such an
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approach in gambling if the least intrusive means were used. If,
through general surveillance, law enforcement has reason to inspect
further, based on either large transactions or suspicious transfer of
funds, a more specified approach would then be taken toward the
possible wrongdoer, who might then become a target of an
investigation.
While the general surveillance approach has its merits in that
all gambling sites licensed could be monitored, its detractions
warrant considering a more targeted philosophy from the outset.
Under general surveillance, an administrative nightmare may be
created, with all figures constantly flooding the regulatory agency,
and law enforcement officials being required to keep abreast of
each company and their unusual transactions. Under a more
targeted approach, spot checks could be made into the various
companies. A greater emphasis would be placed on underground
information so as to hone in on those sites that are believed to be
laundering money. Additionally, greater constitutional justification
will likely exist under this approach, because with information of
suspicious activity and the opportunity for a more detailed probe
into the numbers of one specific company, probable cause would be
required when the initial action is taken.
E. Agreement, Then Action
From international cooperation, to international regulation, to
international enforcement, the problem of eradicating money
laundering via the Internet does not present itself with simple and
easy solutions. However, as an international community, we must
begin to take steps forward to reaching the common goal of crime
prevention. We must all first agree that we have a serious problem
on our hands, and that it therefore warrants serious consideration
into solving it. The law often chases technology. Here the law must
accept a challenge of technological complexity and international
dimensions. Then we must proceed to the nuts and bolts of the
dilemma and decide which are the tools that are needed to fix the
situation at hand. Once we make it through this hoop, we must
work together to enforcing our rules, and ensuring compliance with
our laws. Only time will tell if we will be successful, but time is of
the essence, and action must be taken.
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